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ABSTRACT
The recent advances in mobile devices and wireless communication sector
transformed Mobile Augmented Reality (MAR) from science fiction to a
reality. Incorporating this MAR technology in health care sector elevates
the quality of diagnosis and treatment for the patients. However, due to
the highly sensitive nature of the data being circulated in this process, it is
also highly vulnerable to the security threats. In the thesis, an architecture
is proposed for a MAR health care application based on Multi-access Edge
Computing (MEC). This includes key features such as displaying augmented
view of patient information on the mobile device, augmenting the X-ray or
scan image on top of the patient’s actual body parts to assist the doctor, and
enabling the doctor to interact with an expert and get real time consultancy.
Based on the proposed architecture, all the possible network security
threats are analyzed. Furthermore, a secure key management scheme is
proposed for registration and authentication phases to establish a secure
end-to-end communication between the participating entities in the system.
The security features of the proposed scheme are formally verified by
using Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications
(AIVSPA) tool, Moreover, an informal verification is provided to discuss the
protection against other possible attacks. It has justified that the proposed
scheme is able to provide the required level of security for the system.
Keywords: MAR, MEC, Health Care, Network Security, Privacy, Formal
Verification, Authentication, Key management
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1 INTRODUCTION
The next generation of communication systems, 5G opens the door for countless
opportunities with the integration of new technologies. Some of the key features of the
5G systems like Multi-Access Edge Computing (MEC), Network Function Virtualisation
(NFV), Software-Defined Networking (SDN), helps the 5G networks to provide services
with high data rates, extremely low latency with improved Quality of Service (QoS)
compared to current 4G LTE networks [1, 2]. The architectural change in the
5G networks, from centralized, cloud-based processing to edge computing techniques
reduces the end-to-end latency. This achievement in low latency plays a vital role
in making the most demanding and latency constrained applications like Augmented
Reality (AR)/Virtual Reality (VR) realizable [3]. There is often confusion among the
terminologies VR and AR, the users are fully immersed in a computer-simulated virtual
environment in VR applications, whereas in AR, the users will be in the real environment
and the computer-generated virtual objects will be brought to the real environment
through AR device. When this device is a mobile device, we name this system as a
Mobile Augmented Reality (MAR) system. Since the mobile device like smartphones
and tabs are widely used and easily accessible, we intended to implement an application
in MAR systems. Further details on the MEC server and MAR are discussed in the
literature survey.
1.1 Background and Motivation
The core objective of this MAR technology in the target applications is to provide
computer-simulated assistance to the users. This assistance helps the users to understand
the environment better and make the right decisions. This potential of MAR to redefine
the interaction between the user and the environment enhanced the intended output of
the application in many sectors such as manufacturing industries, education, and health
care. Knowing the potential impact a MAR based health care application could make in
human life, ignited our desire to look for a possible opportunity in the sector. Numerous
researches have already been carried out to find innovative ways to incorporate MAR into
many different applications in the health care sector like remote assistance in surgeries,
X-ray rendering, vein image rendering, etc [4].
We have identified a real issue in the rural areas of developing countries, which has the
potential for MAR incorporation. Since opportunities are concentrated in capital cities,
experts and doctors tend to move there, and it leaves the rural areas with the scarcity
of experts and experienced doctors. So the people in those areas are forced to go to city
hospitals and wait in ques to get admissions, some times they even miss the chances to
get an appointment when needed. Moreover, the inexperienced doctors in rural areas
tend to misdiagnose, and it some times end up in severe consequences. These motivated
us to come up with the MAR based solution discussed in the upcoming section.
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1.2 Research Problem
In order to address these issues discussed in the previous section, we wanted to make
the expert accessible for any doctors and patients, regardless of the location, they live
in, and also wanted to give some AR assistance for the amateur doctors to improve their
diagnosis. We decided to achieve this by proposing a MAR application where the doctor
will be able to get the AR assistance in the diagnosis and will be able to get real-time
consultations from an expert. The circulated data in this application is highly sensitive;
hence, it is mandatory to ensure that security and privacy have never been compromised
in our proposed solution.
1.3 Methodology of the Work
To realize the objective of proposing a secure MAR application, first and foremost
we define the critical functions of the application such as tracking patient records,
augmenting X-ray/scan image of a patient on top of the actual body part being diagnosed,
and when needed, doctor receiving real-time consultation and guidance from expert on
the diagnosis. Next, we study the typical architecture of a MAR system, their functional
components, and process flow. After that, we modify the typical architecture and process
flow to cater to our application functions. Depending on the process flow and architecture
of our particular application and its essential functions, we analyze all the possible
security threats in each entity and communication links and propose possible solutions.
With proper registration and authentication key management scheme, we will be able
to establish a secure communication link between entities, and we will be able to mitigate
the threats and make our application secure. So we propose such a scheme for each phase
in the application. Further, we introduce two or three-way authentications consisting
user name and password, facial recognition, registered device MAC addresses, and X.509
certificate. We also use some previous registration as a prerequisite in the following
registration, which acts as an additional layer of security, so it is mandatory to follow the
same registration order proposed in the scheme. After proposing the scheme, we verify
the protocol using formal verification tool AVISPA, and check whether the scheme is safe
against man in the middle attack and replay attack. Then, we use informal verification
to analyze the security of the application logically.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis has eight chapters. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 explains the literature and related researches that have been carried out.
This chapter has three sections, the first section explains the concept of MAR, typical
architecture and other important details related to MAR. Then the second section MEC
explains about MEC concept, reference architecture and essential functions related the
elements in that architecture. Then the final section discusses the related works carried
out in this domain and discusses the widely accepted formal verification tool which has
been used in verifying similar key exchange schemes.
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Chapter 3 describes the proposed architecture for our application and discusses the
process flow for each scenario of the application that are patient identification and
information retrieval, X-ray/scan rendering, and expert opinion.
Chapter 4 analyses all the possible security threats concerning the proposed
architecture of the application and suggests possible solutions.
Chapter 5 proposes a registration and authentication key exchange scheme to establish
a secure communication link between the entities. In this chapter, the first section
elaborates the proposed scheme for the registration phase of each entity in the application,
and the second section elaborates the proposed scheme for authentication phase during
the interaction between registered entities.
Chapter 6 presents a detailed analysis of formal verification and results for the proposed
scheme. Further, it discusses the limitations in the implementation of the actual scheme
and how it has been addressed.
Chapter 7 is concerned with the informal verification for the proposed scheme and
discusses the attacks prevented by the scheme.
Chapter 8 includes the evaluation of the thesis on meeting the objectives and proposes
some future directions for the research.
Finally, Chapter 9 discusses the conclusion of the thesis.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The new technological advancements enriched our interaction and interpretation with
the environment around us. Based on the interaction and interpretation, the reality-
virtuality continuum can be categorized into four subcategories as Reality, Augmented
Reality (AR), Augmented Virtuality (AV), and Virtual Reality (VR) [5].
Figure 1. Reality-virtuality continuum [5].
In VR, the user is fully immersed in a computer-generated virtual environment, and
he has no interaction between the real environment. However, in AR and AV, which
is commonly called as mixed reality, the virtual and real environments are mixed and
displayed on a chosen device. The way the environments are mixed distinguishes AV
and AR. In AV, the current state of the real-world objects are blended and updated in
the virtual environment the user is immersed. Whereas in AR, the generated virtual
objects are blended in real-time with the real environment and displayed on the display
of a chosen device. The fundamental process of any augmented reality systems can be
summarized into six subsystems as image acquisition, virtual model generator, mixing
realities subsystems, display, manipulator and a tracking subsystem [6]. Recent mobile
technology advancements in built-in cameras, sensors, computational resources and cloud,
edge-based data processing and storage facilities have made AR possible on mobile
devices. AR on mobile devices such as mobile phones, tabs, google glass, other portable
electronic devices with the ability to host AR applications are called as MAR [7, 8]. From
[8], we can say that the characteristics of a MAR system can be defined as follows:
1. Combines real and virtual objects in a real environment.
2. Interactive in real-time.
3. Registers and align real and virtual objects with each other.
4. Runs and displays the augmented view on a mobile device.
can be categorized as MAR. According to the large number of published studies [6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15], a typical architecture of a MAR system can be drawn as in
Figure 2 and the components of typical MAR system can be shown as in Figure 3.
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Figure 2. Typical architecture of MAR system.
Figure 3. Components of typical MAR system.
As shown in Figure 3, the initial image acquisition from the user’s environment is done
through the camera of the mobile device and passed on to the server. In the server,
the target object is detected, and the features are extracted from the image. Then the
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extracted features are matched with the databases, and the target object is identified.
Then according to the software framework, the associated information or image to be
rendered is retrieved and sent back to the device. Meantime, fused sensor input is passed
on to the server, where the template matching and initial pose calculation is done by
comparing it with the stored data. Then the calculated initial pose is passed on to
the device. The device simulator renders the inputs from the server on top of the real-
time camera inputs and displays it to the user. Object tracking part of the software
compares the real-time fused device sensor input concerning the initial pose and update
the rendered information or image, concerning the user’s view of the scene. Due to the
latency constraint nature [12] of the MAR, a care-full design is needed with optimally
offloading the tasks to the server [15].
2.1 Multi Access Edge Computing (MEC)
As per the definition defined by ETSI, bringing the cloud computing capabilities to the
edge of the mobile network closer to the users is called mobile edge computing [16].
The comparison of cloud and edge computing is illustrated in Figure 4. MEC has some
advanced features such as low latency, proximity, high bandwidth, real-time insights into
radio network information and location awareness which makes it a game-changer in
many sectors such as consumer, enterprise and health care [17].
Data2
App1
App2App3
Data3Data1
Cloud	Server
Internet
User	1 User	2 User	3 User	1 User	2 User	3
Data2
App1
App2App3
Data3Data1
Cloud	Server
Data1App1 App3Data3 App2Data2
Edge	Server
Figure 4. Comparison of cloud and edge computing.
Recent advancements in the Network Functions Virtualizations (NFV), Information-
Centric Networks (ICN), and Software Defined Networking (SDN) enabled the
implementation of MEC, based on virtualized platforms [18]. MEC reference architecture,
as described by ETSI [16], is shown in Figure 5. This architecture allows MEC
applications to run as Virtual Machine(VM) on top of virtual infrastructure. The MEC
has two host level management. First one is mobile edge platform manager, which
manages the life cycle of applications, application rules and requirements including service
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authorizations, traffic rules, DNS configurations, and resolving conflicts. The second one
is the virtualization infrastructure manager, which manages the allocation management
and releasing of the resources of the virtualization infrastructure. The User apps and
customer-facing service portal, request the operations support systems for the service.
Then the operations support system evaluates the validity of the request and forwards
the valid requests to the MEC orchestrator. Orchestrator maintains an overall view of
the deployed MEC hosts, available resources available MEC services and topology [17].
Depending on the service required, orchestrator will make an optimal decision on the
process of the request.
The AR application needs low latency and high-speed data processing to provide the
correct and excellent user experience. Hence, incorporating MEC server instead of a
centralized server, for data processing and data access, reduces latency due to long
propagation distances and complexity in the processing [17].
Figure 5. The Reference architecture of MEC [17].
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2.2 Related Works
Due to the merits of MAR systems, the technology has its presence in many sectors such
as tourism and navigation, entertainment and advertisement, training and education,
geometry modeling and scene construction, assembly and maintenance, information
assistant management and health care applications [7, 9]. In this research, we focus on
Incorporating MAR into the health-care sector as it enhances better outcomes in patient
care [9] and has a huge impact on human lives. A considerable amount of research has
already been done in this area, and researchers have proposed some innovative ways
to incorporate AR technology into the health care sector. The study [19] discusses
on AR application in medical education in subject areas like anatomy, surgery, and
forensic medicine and it also discusses the applicability of AR in assisting in actual
medical procedures in laparoscopic surgery, endotracheal intubation, joint injections, and
assistance in placing local anesthesia. The research [20] discusses on optical-see through
augmentation for laparoscopic surgery. The studies [21, 22] discuss augmenting X-ray,
MR scans imagery with the real objects. The literature [23] discusses the application
of AR in surgeries. The extensive survey in [4] refers to many other AR applications
and researches conducted in the health care sector. It mentions applications such as,
the vein viewer which projects patient’s vascular network onto the skin to help with
needle insertion, assisting applications for patients in both physical and neurological
rehabilitation, applications which could augment the information from medical scan
images to a surgeon in a convenient manner during surgeries, applications which could
be used for educational training such as visualizing human anatomy, visualizing 3D lung
dynamics and training of laparoscopy skills. The work carried out in [24] discusses
a virtual interactive presence and augmented reality platform that allows a remote
surgeon to deliver real-time virtual assistance to a local surgeon, over a standard Internet
connection.
Based on the works done in this AR applications in the health care sector, we have
identified few key features to be included in our proposed MAR based health care
application to enrich the health care services provided to the people regardless of the
place where they are living.
2.3 Formal Verification Methods
Security protocols have to be verified before they are actually implemented. There are
no such ways to prove that a protocol is perfectly safe and unbreakable. However, the
strength of a protocol can be verified with the measure of relative complexity in breaching
the security properties [25]. The formal verification method is used to verify the protocols
by logically and mathematically model the system and security systems, and validate
whether it achieves the expected level of security [26]. The extensive study carried out
in [27] discusses formal verification methods. For a complex protocol, security analysis
involves a large number of steps. Hence, the task needs to be automated. Depending
on the automation techniques, the verification method is distinguished. Based on this,
there are two notable formal verification methods. First one is logics of beliefs (BAN
Logic), a modal logic system based on beliefs of the entities in the protocol, and the
second one is Dolev-Yao (DY) model, a discrete state transition system which tracks the
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messages instead of beliefs. In this model, the behaviors of the agents participating in the
protocol are defined with send, receive messages, whereas the behavior of the attacker is
left undefined. The DY model could be formalized in many different ways, as discussed
in the literature [27]. However, automated by state exploration is highly suitable for
our application. This technique runs and looks for all possible violations of the defined
security properties in the model runs, and when the desired property is violated in any
of the model runs, the analysis will conclude that the protocol is unsafe. In the thesis, a
widely used state exploration technique based tool named AVISPA is used for verification.
2.3.1 AVISPA
Further, the researches [28, 29, 30, 31] uses Automated Validation of Internet Security
sensitive Protocols and Applications (AVISPA), a widely known formal verification tool
to validate their proposed security protocols. The architecture of the AVISPA tool is
shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. The architecture of AVISPA tool [29].
From the references [29, 32, 28], the following understandings were acquired. In
AVISPA, the user specifies the security problem or in other words, a protocol with
expected security goal in High level protocol specification language (HLPSL). The role
based script written in HLPSL is then translated into Intermediate format(IF) using
HLPSL2IF translator. IF specification describes an infinite state transition system which
is suitable for formal analysis. This IF specification is fed to one of the four back-ends
of the AVISPA tool. Each back end has different techniques to search the corresponding
infinite state transition system for states that represent the attacks on the intended
properties of the protocols. The current version of the tool has four back ends.
1. On the Fly Model Checker OFMC.
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2. Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher CL-Atse.
3. SAT based Model Checker SATMC.
4. tree automata based on automatic approximation of the analysis of security
protocols TA4SP.
These back ends, analyze protocols and check whether our security goals are met.
The intruder is modeled using Dolev Yao (DY) model [33], which allows the intruder
to act as an authorized entity with the knowledge we declared. After the analysis, the
tool provides the result as SAFE or UNSAFE. When the output is UNSAFE, we can
simulate the attack simulation and see how the attack is being carried out by the intruder.
We can also simulate the protocol by using protocol simulation and check the variable
values using variable monitoring tab. In this way, we can ensure that the protocol is
being successfully simulated. Further explanations about the tool and declarations are
discussed in the formal verification chapter.
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3 PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
From the analysis of current issues in health care systems, we have identified the following
key issues.
1. Inexperienced doctors face difficulties in consulting patients by checking X-ray and
scan reports.
2. Patients and doctors in rural areas require the second opinion from expert surgeons
working internationally, but it is not practical in most cases.
We are proposing a MAR application to address these issues together with additional
features. The key features of our MAR application are as follows.
1. Doctor can use this application and see the augmented view of the patient’s X-
ray/scan report on top of the patient’s affected area, and he can perform precise
medical check-ups.
2. Doctor/expert can access previous medical histories, reports, and other information
with the patient’s permission and see the augmented results on the screen.
3. Doctor can request for second opinions from a registered expert, and then the expert
can join and interact with the doctor regardless of his location. The augmented
view of the expert’s inputs are displayed on doctor’s device in real-time.
Based on the AR architectures discussed in [13, 14, 15] architecture of our MAR
application is proposed. For easy understanding, the typical architecture of MAR
mentioned in Figure 2 and Figure 3 is modified in accordance to each main scenarios
of our application as illustrated in the following context.
Figure 7 shows the architecture of the first scenario that is patient identification
and information retrieval. Registered doctor authenticates himself and logs into the
application, after that he inputs patient identity details through the User Interface (UI)
and requests for past medical records, X-ray, scan reports, and other information. The
request is then passed on to the edge server. Edge server then verifies doctor, patient
log in credentials and retrieve all the data related to the patient from cloud and stores
it in the edge server. Then the edge server sends back the specific information requested
by the doctor, to the doctor’s mobile device. The simulator function of the application
software in the mobile device grabs the user interface input, selections, the input from
the edge server and renders it on top of real-time camera input on the display.
Figure 8 shows the architecture of the second scenario that is augmenting X-Ray /
Scan report on top of patient’s actual body part. Here the doctor places a marker on the
patient’s body part he wants to examine. Then he holds the device on top of the body
part, and requests the application for an augmented view of X-ray or scan report. The
service request and the device camera input are passed on to the edge server. The edge
server then retrieves the respective X-ray or scan report from its database, and calculates
the initial pose of the doctor. After that it passes both calculated initial pose, and the
image to be rendered, to the requested doctor’s mobile device. The simulator function
in the mobile device simulates the scene by rendering the image received from the edge
server on top of the device camera input. Further, the object tracking part updates
the pose of the doctor based on the current camera input, and initial pose information
17
Figure 7. Patient identification and information retrieval.
it received from the edge server. Based on this pose update, the simulator adjusts the
simulation on display and produces a realistic augmented view for the doctor with respect
to his movements.
Figure 9 shows the architecture of the third scenario that is doctor seeking an expert
opinion. While consulting the patient, the doctor may wish to have a second opinion in
diagnosis or report analysis from an expert. Doctor then uses the user interface of the
application and requests the expert for his consultancy. When the expert accepts the
invitation, the final rendered output with a marker that has been displayed in the doctor’s
device is video streamed to the expert’s device. The expert then interacts with the doctor
regarding the issue. When needed, he requests the edge server for the patient’s medical
information through the user interface. Expert’s device then retrieves the information
from the edge server and displays the augmented output in a similar manner explained
in scenario 1 Figure 7. The expert then provides his real-time interactive consultation to
the doctor, his real-time markings on his display on X-rays, scan reports are streamed
back to the doctor’s device. In the doctor’s device, the simulator function maps expert’s
consultation inputs with respect to the marker in the affected area of the patient and
renders it in the output shown in the display.
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Figure 8. X-Ray/scan rendering.
Figure 9. Expert opinion.
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4 SECURITY ANALYSIS OF MEC BASED MAR
ARCHITECTURE
All the possible security threats for the proposed architecture has been analyzed, and
viable prevention techniques have been discussed in this section. The threat vector model
for our application architecture is shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10. Security threat vectors.
Threat vector 1: Attack on mobile device
The attacker can use third-party applications to gain access to the device and its
sensors and obtain information about the surroundings and track the patient’s location
and misuse them [34]. Similar kind of attack named as place raider attack has been
discussed in [35]. An attacker can manipulate the outputs and perform clickjacking attack
[36] to suddenly display sensitive request and make the user give permission which could
affect the privacy of the data being handled.
possible solutions: Sensor access can be limited in a way that they start to function
only when the marker on the patient’s body part is scanned. Third-party access could be
restricted while using this app. Output policies could be defined to detect abnormalities
in the display.
Threat vector 2: Attack on the network between edge server and mobile
device
An attacker can perform a man in the middle attack and access the sensitive data like
X-ray, patient’s medical history and exploit them. He can also generate virtual traffic
and perform a DoS attack.
possible solutions: Proper authentication and encryption scheme should be followed,
puzzles could be used to prevent dos attacks.
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Threat vector 3: Attack on edge server
Data: The previous studies [37, 38] discuss the possible attacks that could be
performed in edge server. An internal or external adversary can access edge server and
view data, tamper them, redirect to another rogue storage, which will breach the data
confidentiality and integrity of the data. The attacker could gain access to the system
by performing kernel-level operations and escalate the privilege for the administrator.
He could also perform a DoS attack and prevent the edge server from providing data
services.
possible solutions: Data could be stored, processed, and transmitted in the encrypted
domain, using the techniques described in [39, 40, 41]. Proper authentication scheme
could be implemented, and puzzle challenges could be used to prevent DoS attack.
Services: Apart from data, the attacker can also target for other services offered
by the edge server. Attackers could use third-party applications on the same platform
as network functions to infiltrate the platform and affect network functions like traffic
control rules, DNS handling, service registry running on the platform. Attackers can
negatively use the application-aware performance optimization; for example, they can
starve the competitor applications and their customers of radio resources which will force
them to end up in denial of service for their customers. Attackers could also fill the local
caches with useless content unusable by subscribers, and exhaust resources needed by
network functions. Furthermore, they can spoof or modify the instructions transmitted
by MEC orchestrator and disrupt the virtualization infrastructure manager and mobile
edge platform manager.
possible solutions: Application quality assurance framework could be used only to
allow trusted application, the edge computing applications and network functions could
be run in robustly segregated virtual machines, a secure authentication and encryption
mechanism could be implemented, and priority policies can be set to allocate a dedicated
cache for AR application while using, and machine learning techniques could also be used
to detect anomalies in content requests.
Threat vector 4: Attack on the network between edge server and cloud
server
Adversaries can perform a man in the middle attack and access sensitive data or
manipulate the medical data and mislead the doctor and the expert. Moreover, they can
also overload the cloud server with multiple streams of data flow with multiple virtual
machines and perform a DDoS attack.
possible solutions: Strong encryption and authentication scheme could be implemented,
puzzle-based prevention could be used to prevent DDoS attack, machine learning
techniques could be used to detect anomalies in the traffic patterns and divert or filter
the unwanted packets.
Threat vector 5: Attack on cloud server
With attacks discussed in [42], internal or external adversaries could access cloud
service and view, tamper and redirect data to another rogue storage. Adversaries could
impersonate the edge server and access sensitive information from the cloud. As discussed
in [43] adversaries could perform cloud Malware injection attack and side-channel attack,
and also the adversaries could physically damage the cloud resources.
possible solutions: Strong encryption and authentication scheme could be implemented,
backup of data with proper encryption could be kept, resources could be kept in high
secured zones with limited access, a hypervisor could be deployed to validate and integrate
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virtual machines, a combination of virtual firewall appliances could be used to prevent
side-channel attacks.
Threat vector 6: Attack on internet connection between entities
An attacker can perform a man in the middle attack and access application control
related information and input malicious software updates to make the application
completely insecure, and the attacker could also perform a DoS attack.
possible solutions: Proper encryption and authentication scheme could be
implemented, and puzzle-based challenge could be used to prevent DoS attack.
Threat vector 7: Attack on software management
Internal employees could misuse their access to modify the software and upload
malicious updates and create loopholes or access the data storage and retrieve sensitive
data and exploit them.
possible solutions: Source code access could be limited to very few people in the
company and could be protected with facial recognition-based authentication. All source
codes and other data could be stored in an encrypted form with proper backup storage.
Threat vector 8: Attack on expert’s device
Malicious third-party apps could be used to access inputs from the doctor, edge server,
and outputs from the expert, and then the sensitive information about the patient and
the consultation details could be exploited.
possible solutions: The access of the third-party applications could be restricted while
using the app. Output policies could be defined as discussed in threat vector 1. Highly
secure and efficient encryption and authentication scheme could be used.
In order to mitigate these threats, a registration and authentication scheme is proposed
in the next chapter.
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5 PROPOSED REGISTRATION AND AUTHENTICATION
SCHEME
Our protocol has two main phases, the registration phase, and the authentication phase.
In the registration phase, the details of the entities are uploaded to the certificate
authority. Then the implicit certificate which has the public key of the entity is obtained
from the certificate authority. The obtained certificate is used by the entity to derive its
private key.
Table 1. Notations used in the scheme
Notation Description
QEXCA Public key of External Certificate Authority
dEXCA Private key of External Certificate Authority
Ns Random number generated by server
Nc Random number generated by client
kdos Puzzle difficulty level
X509EXCA X509 certificate of the external certificate authority
X solution of the Puzzle
Y solution of the hash value
gcd Greatest common devider
QEdge Public key of edge server
dEdge Private key of edge server
CSR Certificate signing request
H Oneway hash function
rEdge random integer value generated by Edge
REdge Elliptic curve point generated by Edge
G Generator function
rAdmin random integer value generated by Admin device
RAdmin Elliptic curve point generated by Admin device
Rdevice Elliptic curve point generated by device
K Secret key for HMAC function
CertAdmin Implicit certificate of Admin device
Certdevice Implicit certificate of doctor/expert device
e Integer used to keep hash value of implicit certificate
s Private key reconstruction value
rUser random integer value generated by registered user
RUser Elliptic curve point generated by registered user
KAES Session key
QDdevice Public key of Doctor device
dDdevice Private key of Doctor device
CertDdevice Implicit certificate of Doctor device
QEdevice Public key of Expert device
dEdevice Private key of Expert device
CertEdevice Implicit certificate of Expert device
Nonce Random cryptographic nonce
23
Likewise, in the authentication phase, the authenticity of the entities is verified using
their implicit certificates and other additional authentication mechanisms like facial
recognition, and log-in credentials. Finally, a session key is established safely in this
phase. In the registration process of edge server, external certificate authority acts as
the certificate authority. However, in all the other cases, the edge server acts as the
certificate authority to the participating entities.
5.1 Registration Phase
The main tasks in this phase are, registering the entity’s details by the Certification
Authority (CA), and providing a certificate for authentication purpose inside the
network. For all the other cases the edge server acts as CA and saves entity’s details and
provides ECQV implicit certificate[44] to the requesting entities. In our scheme, we have
used some registered entity’s credentials as a pre-requisite for other entity’s registrations,
so the registration process has to follow the defined order. First and foremost, the edge
server has to be registered with external CA as illustrated in Figure 11, here external
CA registers edge server and provides X.509 certificate to it. Then secondly, the network
administrators from hospital and software company should register themselves together
with their computers/devices on their edge servers as illustrated in Figure 12. After
that on the company side, their registered admin will register the company workers and
their computers on their edge server, as shown in Figure 13. On the hospital side, the
registered admin will register the doctor, expert devices and then they will register the
doctors and experts on edge server through an already registered device as explained in
Figure 14 and Figure 15. Then finally, the network admin registers the patient on the
edge server through his registered device, as shown in Figure 16. The boxes with red
letters in the figures indicate the stored information on that side. In the scheme, similar
puzzle-based challenge described in [45] is used to prevent DoS attack where the edge
server sends a puzzle and expects the client to solve it to show it is a legitimate client.
From the understandings of [46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51], we found ECDH (Elliptic-Curve
Diffie–Hellman) is highly secure and faster and well suited key exchange scheme for our
application.
Step 1: Edge server registration
As shown in Figure 11, edge server initiates the conversation with the external CA
with a hello message and cipher suites it supports. External certificate authority chooses
a random number Ns, then chooses kdos depending on the severity of the DoS attack and
sends back to the edge server together with a hello message, selected cipher suite, and
its X.509 certificate to authenticate itself as legit. Upon completing this handshake with
CA, the edge server generates a random number Nc and finds a solution X for the puzzle
in a way that when Nc, Ns, X are concatenated and hashed with QEXCA as key, it gives
a value with first kdos bits as 0.
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Hello, Cipher Suite
Edge Server
p,q random large prime numbers
n=pq
µ(n)=lcm(p-1,q-1)
Public key QEdge:
1< QEdge < µ(n) & gcd(QEdge, µ(n) )=1
Private key dEdge:
dEdge = QEdge 
-1 mod µ(n)
Verifies edge server details
EQEdge 
[Ns, Nc, X, Nonce],
Send CSR: EdEdge
[edge identity details], QEdgeQEdge , dEdge
QEXCA , dEXCA
External CA
QEdge,server details
Sign certificate
EdEXCA
(identity details, QEdge,CA details)
Finished, Acknowledgement, X509Edge X509Edge
X509Edge Finished, Acknowledgement
Hello, Cipher Suite(selected) ,X509EXCA , Ns, kdos
H(QEXCA ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
Choose Ns,kdos
Nc, H(QEXCA ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
Nonce
Ns,kdos 
Ns,kdos 
Figure 11. Message flow for the registration phase of edge server.
Then the edge server generates its public and private key pairs based on RSA key
generation algorithm [52]. Then the edge server encrypts the Nc, Ns, X, Nonce with
the public key of the external certificate authority(EXCA), to make sure it is only
accessible by that certificate authority and sends it to the server together with the
certificate sign request (CSR) [53]. The CSR also includes the edge identity details
signed by the edge server and the derived public key of the edge server. Once the EXCA
receives this message, it verifies the puzzle answer by doing the same hash function
and comparing with the stored kdos value. After that, EXCA sends and X.509 identity
certificate digitally signed with the private key of EXCA together with the finished
message. The message flow ends with the finished message from the edge server to EXCA.
Step 2: Network admin registration
As shown in Figure 12, network admin from his computer or device initiates the
conversation with the edge server with a hello and cipher suites it supports. The edge
server then chooses a random number rEdge1 and computes an elliptic curve point REdge1
= G.rEdge1, here the G is a known elliptic curve function for both parties. Then same as
in the previous case, the edge server generates a puzzle for DoS attack prevention and
sends it back to the network admin together with the newly generated elliptic curve point,
and the X.509 certificate to network admin. Network admin solves the puzzle the same
way the edge server did in step 1 and then generates two random numbers rAdmin1 and
rAdmin2. Then it computes one key for the hash function K=rAdmin1.REdge1, an elliptic
curve point RAdmin1 = G.rAdmin1 to compute the key K in edge server end, an elliptic
curve point to calculate the certificate RAdmin2 = G.rAdmin2 and a Nonce for message
freshness. HMAC is produced by hashing the RAdmin2.Nonce with two hash functions
with keys QEdge and K. After computing all these, the puzzle ans as in step 1 is encrypted
with the public key of the edge server and send together with RAdmin1, RAdmin2, Nonce
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to indicate message freshness and HMAC value to ensure that the message is delivered
without any alterations.
Hello, Cipher Suite(ECDH_SHA3)
Verify nonce
Hello ,Cipher Suite(selected), X509 certificate, 
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]
Verify MAC
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Ns,kdos 
RAdmin1
, RAdmin2 
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QAdmin , dAdmin
QEdge , dEdge
User name & Hashed Passowrd
rAdmin1
ϵ[1,n-1], RAdmin1
= G. rAdmin1
K= rAdmin1
rEdge1
G
RAdmin1
, Nonce , RAdmin2
REdge1
= G. rEdge1
rEdge2
, REdge2
, CertAdmin ,S,
QAdmin, Nonce
K= rAdmin1
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G
K
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HMAC(K) = H(K||H(QEdge||(RAdmin2
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rEdge2
ϵ[1,n-1],REdge2
= G. rEdge2
CertAdmin= RAdmin2
+ REdge2
e=H(QEdge || CertAdmin)
QAdmin = QEdge + CertAdmin e
S = dEdge + rEdge2
e
Nonce
HMAC(K) = H(K||H(QEdge ||(CertAdmin,S, Nonce))
CERTIFICATE : CertAdmin,S,Nonce, HMAC(K), 
Request for Registration credentials
CertAdmin ,S,
Nonce
dAdmin=S + rAdmin2
H(QEdge || Certadmin)
Qadmin = dAdminG
Finished,Acknowledgement
EQEdge
[username,admin details,  hash of 
password], Facial recognition input,Finished
admin name, id number, photo
Network admin
Choose Ns,kdos, rEdge1
Nc, H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
EQEdge 
[Ns, Nc, X], RAdmin1 
, CERTIFICATE REQ : RAdmin2
,
HMAC(K), Nonce
Verify H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
rEdge1
Verify MAC
Figure 12. Message flow for the registration phase of network admin.
Upon receiving this message, the edge server verifies the puzzle answer, and then it
verifies the nonce to ensure the message is fresh. After that it computes the key by K=
RAdmin1.rEdge1 for the second hash function used in computing the HMAC value. Once
the HMAC value is verified, the edge server uses the elliptic curve point RAdmin2 and
newly generated random number rEdge2 to compute the certificate. The certificate is
computed, as shown in Figure 12. S is the private key reconstruction value that will be
used by the network admin to compute his private key.
Edge then computes the HMAC value of CertAdmin.S.Nonce and sends it together in
a message with CertAdmin, S, Nonce and a request for network admin to provide his
registration details, user name and password he wishes to use in next log-in, and a
facial recognition input to verify that the message is originated from admin only. Upon
receiving this message, the network admin verifies the MAC value. Then by using private
key reconstruction value, CertAdmin, and the previously generated rAdmin2, network admin
computes the private and public keys as shown in the figure.
After obtaining the keys, he uses the public key of the edge to encrypt the admin
registration details together with MAC address of the device he is using, his chosen
user name and a hashed password and sends it back to the edge server with his facial
recognition input. Edge server receives this message, and it checks the facial recognition
input with the already stored image details, and ensures the message is from admin,
and then proceed to save the registration details securely, and finally, the message flow
finishes with the finished and acknowledgment message from the edge server to admin.
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Step 3: Company workers and devices registration
As shown in Figure 13, the registered network admin responsible in the software
company, initiates the registration with a hello message. First few steps of handshake
continue as explained in previous steps, then the admin will use his log-in credentials by
sending them encrypted with the public key of the edge server. Once the edge server
verifies the user name and password, it asks the network admin to send the registration
details together with admin’s facial input as a final verification.
Hello, Cipher Suite(ECDH_SHA3)
Network admin Edge Server
Verifies facial input and stores all credentials
QAdmin , dAdmin
QEdge , dEdge, QAdmin
User names , Hashed 
Password, photos & 
computer  MAC address
Verifies user name and password of 
network admin  
EQEdge
[company workers username, hash of passwords, photos of workers 
,mac address of computers], facial recognition input of admin, Finished
request for registration details, network admin 
facial recognition input
admin name, id number, 
photo
QEdge, Ns,kdos 
Choose Ns,kdos
Nc, H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
EQEdge 
[Ns, Nc, X, admin username, hash of password]
H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
Hello ,Cipher Suite(selected), X509 certificate, Ns,kdos, 
request for username and password
Finished,Acknowledgement
Figure 13. Message flow for the registration phase of company workers and devices.
The network admin uses his registered device, and then register the company workers,
and their computer MAC addresses in the edge server. The network admin will create
user name and passwords for the company workers and then feed those details together
with workers photos to the edge server, and these photos will be used by edge server
when the company worker gives his facial recognition input next time he logs in. Finally,
he verifies this registration by giving his facial recognition input. The edge server verifies
the facial input and then stores the registration details safely. Message flow ends with
the finished and acknowledgment message from the edge server to the admin.
Step 4: Doctor and expert devices registration
The registered network admins responsible in the hospitals will use their log-in
credentials from their registered devices and feed the MAC addresses of the devices
about to be used by the doctor and experts. These registered devices will be provided
by the network admins to the doctors and experts in the hospital, but experts might be
moving from one or more hospitals, and even they may travel around the world, this will
make the registration process complex, this is left for future works at the moment.
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dDevice=S + rDevice2
H(QEdge || CertDevice)
QDevice = dDeviceG
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EQEdge
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address], Facial recognition input,Finished
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Network admin
Choose Ns,kdos, rEdge1
Nc, H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
EQEdge 
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, CERTIFICATE REQ : RDevice2
,
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Verify H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
rEdge1
Verify MAC
Figure 14. Message flow for the registration phase of expert/doctor devices.
Now it is assumed that the expert attends one particular hospital, and the network
admin can do the registration of the expert and expert device, message flow in this step
flows as per Figure 14. The message flow is the same as in registration of the network
admin in step 2 until the device receives its public key and computes the private key.
Soon after storing the keys in the device, the network admin will use his user name,
hashed password, and the device MAC address encrypted with the public key of the
edge server for registration. The edge server verifies the user name and password, and
then wait for the facial recognition input of the admin, once it is also verified it will
store the MAC address, and consider the device as a registered device in the future
log-in attempts. Finally, the message flow ends with the finished and acknowledgment
from edge serve to network admin.
Step 5: Doctor and expert registration
After the registration of the devices of doctors and experts, network admin creates a
user name and password for the doctor and expert and then registers that username,
password, other details and photos of the doctor and expert in the edge server. Message
flow for this step is as shown in Figure 15. Here the majority of the message flow is
similar to step 3, but here the network admin uses his log-in credentials in the registered
doctor, expert devices. Hence the MAC address of the device is verified together with
network admin log-in credentials at the edge server end. Once edge server verifies all
those details, it again verifies the facial input of the network admin and then stores the
details of the doctor, expert, their user names, and corresponding hashed passwords. The
message flow ends with the finished and acknowledgment message from the server.
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Hello, Cipher Suite(ECDH_SHA3)
Network admin & AR  device/computer Edge Server
Verifies facial recognition input of network admin  
QEdge , QDevice , dDevice 
QEdge , dEdge, QDevice 
Doctor/expert 
username,hashed passoword, 
photo
Verifies user name and password of 
network admin  
EQEdge
[doctor user name, hashed password, doctor details, Photo of 
doctor], Facial recognition input of network admin , Finished
request for registration details, network admin 
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photo,MAC
`
Ns,kdos 
Choose Ns,kdos
Nc, H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
Nonce
EQEdge 
[Ns, Nc, X, admin username, hash of password, Device MAC 
address, Nonce]
H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
Hello ,Cipher Suite(selected), X509 certificate, Ns,kdos, request 
for username and password
Finished,Acknowledgement
Verifies MAC address of device
Stores doctor/expert credentials
Figure 15. Message flow for the registration phase of expert/doctor.
Step 6: Patient registration
In the final step of the registration phase, the network admin registers the patient
details when he comes to the hospital. He collects the patient details, his medical
histories, Phone number, Photo, and his consent to store and use the data. After that,
he creates a user name for the patient, and uses his registered device, and starts the
registration process as shown in Figure 16.
Hello, Cipher Suite(ECDH__SHA3)
Network admin from his computer/device Edge Server
QEdge , QAdmin , dAdmin 
QEdge , dEdge, QAdmin 
Verifies user name and password of network admin  
EQEdge
[patient username, name, date of birth, phone number, 
photo of patient],facial recognition input of admin, Finished
request for registration details, network admin 
facial recognition input
admin name, id number, 
photo,MAC
`
Ns,kdos 
Choose Ns,kdos
Nc, H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
Nonce
EQEdge 
[Ns, Nc, X, admin username, hash of password, 
Device MAC address, Nonce]
H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
Hello ,Cipher Suite(selected), X509 certificate, Ns,kdos, request 
for username and password
Finished,Acknowledgement
Verifies MAC address of device
Verifies facial input and stores all credentials
User name , name, date of birth, 
phone number,photo of patient
Generate password and sends to provided 
patient’s phone No
Stores hashed password with patient details
Hashed password of patient
Figure 16. Message flow for the registration phase of patients.
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This process is also similar to step 5, but when the edge server request for the
registration details, admin provides the user name of the patient and all the details
he collected from the patient, together with admin’s facial recognition input. Once the
edge server verifies the admin facial recognition input, it stores all the patient-related
information, and then sends a temporary passcode for patient’s mobile number for one-
time log-in. The patient can use this code to log-in the first time, and later, the password
can be changed as he wishes. The message flow ends with the finished message from the
edge server.
5.2 Authentication Phase
This phase explains the message flow when the registered users like doctors, experts,
Patients try to communicate with the edge server and the message flow when doctor
and expert initiate communication between them. The primary target of this phase is to
establish a session key securely.
Phase 1: Registered user and device
In this phase, the already registered users who have their log-in credentials use their
registered devices to initiate the communication with their edge server and establish a
session key between the edge server and themselves. Since the message flow for the
doctor, expert, network admin, patient in this phase are same, those entities have been
commonly referred to as user as shown in Figure 17.
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[ REdge]
Edge Server
QEdge, REdge Ns,kdos 
QEdge , QDevice, dEdge
K ,KAES
KAES
Registered Doctor 
& device 
credentials
Registered user& Device
Nc, H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
EQEdge 
[Ns, Nc, X], CertDevice , Ruser, Nonce , HMAC(K)
QDevice , dDevice, 
CertDevice 
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Choose Ns,kdos, rEdge
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HMAC(K) = H(K ||H(QEdge ||(CertDevice , Nonce))
ruserϵ[1,n-1]
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Nonce
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K= ruserrEdge1
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Verify H(QEdge ||Nc, Ns, X)=01…0kdos
Y
Verify MAC
Facial recognition input, Finished Verify facial input
Ruser, Nonce
EQEdge
[registered username, hashed password, Device MAC address]
Figure 17. Message flow for the authentication phase of user and devices with edge server.
The user initiates the communication with the edge server, by sending hello message
and the cipher suite it supports. Then the edge server creates a Puzzle for DoS attack
prevention just like in the registration phase, generates a random number rEdge1 and
computes an elliptic curve point REdge1 = G.rEdge1 to compute a key K, which is to be
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used for hash function in HMAC like in the registration phase. Then edge server responds
with selected cipher suite, its X.509 certificate, puzzle, and REdge1 signed by the edge
to show that it is being originated from the edge server. User device solves the puzzle,
generate a random number and an elliptic curve point rUser1, RUser1, then compute the
key K as shown in the figure. With the newly generated key K, and the public key of the
edge, it produces an HMAC value by hashing the CertDevice. Then it encrypts the puzzle
answer with the public key of the edge server, and then sends it together with the elliptic
curve point RUser1, Nonce to show the freshness of the message, and HMAC to verify that
the message is delivered as it is generated. Together with this message, the user sends
his registered user name, hashed password, and device MAC address encrypted with the
public key of the edge server. Upon receiving this message, the edge server first checks
the puzzle answer, and once it is correct, it verifies the nonce and confirms the freshness
of the message. After that, it computes the key with K = RUser1.rEdge1, then it uses its
public key and K to verify the HMAC value, and confirms the integrity of the message.
After this, it computes the symmetric AES session key using the private key of the
KAES=dEdge.QDevice.Nonce which is equivalent to KAES=dEdge.dDevice.G.Nonce here, the
nonce is added to make the key only valid for the session, and it forbids the reuse of
that key by any entity. After computing this key, the edge server encrypts it, using the
public key of the user device, and sign it with its private key, and this ensures that only
the user can access the key, and it also verifies to the user that the key is being by the
edge server. Edge server also requests facial recognition input from the user, to ensure
it has delivered the key correctly to the correct person. Once the user receives the key
successfully, he will give his facial recognition input with a finished message. Edge server
finally verifies the facial input from the user and concludes that the session key has been
delivered to the user safely, and a safe session has been established with the user.
Phase 2: Registered doctor and expert
In this phase, the doctor and expert will authenticate each other and establish a session
key between them. Since doctor and expert will be far away from each other, hence they
will have different edge servers as their certificate authorities. In this case, they cant
use their certificates provided by their edge servers for mutual authentication. Message
flow for this phase is as shown in Figure 18. When the doctor wants to get the expert
opinion, he initiates the communication with the expert by sending a hello message,
and the cipher suite he supports, upon receiving this the expert sends back the hello
message with selected cipher suite, and the certificate provided by his edge server, in
the Figure 18 expert’s edge server is named as edge server 2. The doctor then forwards
this certificate to his edge server, which is named as edge server 1 in the Figure 18,
and requests edge server 1 to provide a session key to communicate with the expert.
Then edge server1 generates a random number rEdge1 and generates an elliptic curve
point REdge1 = G.rEdge1. After that the edge server 1 initiates the communication with
the edge server 2, by sending hello message, cipher suite it supports, X.509 certificate
provided by an external certificate authority to prove his identity, the certificate of the
expert device which was forwarded by doctor, REdge1 signed with his private key, and
a nonce to ensure the message freshness. The edge server 2 understands that a client
of edge server 1 needs a session key to communicate with his client indicated in the
CertEdevice, then it generates a random number and elliptic curve point rEdge2,REdge2 =
G.rEdge2, and computes the session key using KAES=rEdge2.REdge1 which is equivalent to
KAES=rEdge2.G.rEdge1.
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Figure 18. Message flow for the authentication phase between doctor and expert.
After computing the session key, edge server 2 signs the elliptic curve point REdge2
concatenated with a Nonce, to ensure the authenticity and freshness of the elliptic curve
point, and sends it back to edge server 1, together with usual handshake message as
shown in Figure 18. Upon receiving this point, edge server 1 computes the required
session key by KAES=rEdge1.REdge2, which is equivalent to KAES=rEdge1.G.rEdge2. By
this time, both servers have computed the session key required for their own clients.
Then edge server1 encrypts the session key with the public key of the doctor and sign
it with its private key, and sends it together with a finished message. Edge server 2,
on the other hand, does the same but it encrypts the session key with the public key of
the expert, and signs it with its private key and sends with a finished message. Upon
receiving the keys, both doctor and expert send a finished message to their own servers
and ends the communication.
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6 FORMAL VERIFICATION
This chapter discusses the implementation and verification of the protocols proposed in
chapter 5, using HLPSL language and AVISPA tool. Moreover, a detailed explanation
of each scenario of the protocol is described in each subsection.
6.1 Simulation for Registration Phase
In this section, formal verification of the registration phase of each entities has been
discussed. The registration scheme for each cases has been implemented in HLPSL
language and verified by setting proper goals. Further, each subsections clearly explains
the HLPSL implementation of a registration scenario in AVISPA tool, and discusses
about the limitations and alternative approaches in the implementation of the actual
scheme.
6.1.1 Registration of Network Admin
As we can see from Figure 12, the communication is taking place between the network
admin and the edge server, therefore, there are two basic roles: network admin device
and edge server, which are denoted by the Admindevice and Edge, respectively. For the
Admindevice, the role specifications are shown in Figure 19, and role specifications for
the Edge is shown in Figure 20, the Admindevice receives (RCV ) a start signal and then
changes its initial state from 0 to 1 and sends (Hello’) using SND() operation to the
Edge. Here the ’ stands for a new value or new state.
Upon receiving this message with RCV(Hello’), Edge moves from state 0 to state 1,
and then Edge generates new random value for Xedge1 with the command new(), here
Xedge1 represents the redge1 in Figure 12. Edge then computes the elliptic curve point
Redge1’ using exp(G,Xedge1’) function, it also generates new values and assigns it to
Kdos’ and Ns’. After these computation, by using SND command it sends the message
(Hello’.{Kedge}_inv(Kexca).Ns’.Kdos’.{Redge1’}_inv(Kedge)) to agent Admindevice.
In HLPSL, {Redge1’}_inv(Kedge) stands for encrypting the Redge1’ with the
private key of the Edge. Likewise, {Kedge}_inv(Kexca) stands for the public key
of Edge signed by the private key of the external certificate authority. Since
there is no direct way to implement the X.509 certificate, {Kedge}_inv(Kexca)
has been used to replicate X.509 certificate issued by external certificate authority.
As a continuation of the message flow, Admindevice receives the message
(Hello’.{Kedge’}_inv(Kexca).Ns’.Kdos’.{Redge1’}_inv(Kedge’)) with RCV command.
Here Admindevice receives the Kedge value for the first time therefore, it has been denoted
as Kedge’. After receiving this Admindevice goes from state 1 to state 2, and generates
values for Xadmindevice1 and Xadmindevice2 as shown in the Figure 19. The values
Xadmindevice1 and Xadmindevice2 represents the rAdmin1 and rAdmin2 from Figure 12
respectively. AVISPA tool does not support any computations, hence we could not
implement the process of puzzleans, instead, we have generated a fresh value from the
Admindevice. Likewise, our actual HMAC function has two hash functions with two
different keys but we could not implement that so we defined two different hash functions
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as Hash1 and Hash2, and used it to calculate the HMAC value. After computing the
values it sends them to Edge as shown in Figure 19. The Edge receives this message and
moves from state 1 and state 2. Since the edge server already knows Kedge,
Figure 19. HLPSL specification for role admin.
the code changes from Kedge’ to Kedge, all the other new values remained to be denoted
with ’ within the RCV command.
After receiving this, Edge now has to generate the certificate, but AVISPA tool does
not support the arithmetic operations involved in the certificate computation. Hence, a
fresh value is generated for Kadmindevice’, and signed it with the private key of Edge,
and used it as a certificate issued by the edge to the Admindevice. The private key
reconstruction value is generated just as a new value, without any actual arithmetic. The
other functions are carried out as previously explained. Then, Edge sends the message
back to Admindevice as shown in Figure 20. The Admindevice receives this message and
generates a random value to represent a freshly generated Details, and sends it back
together with facial recognition input. However, in HLPSL there are no direct ways to
implement the facial recognition input, hence a facial recognition input is defined as a
known secret message Facialrecognition between Admindevice and Edge. Upon receiving
the last message, Admindevice signs the Facialrecognition message with its private key,
concatenate with generated Details’, and encrypts it with the public key of the Edge
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and sends it to the Edge. This alternative approach for the facial recognition input can
authenticate the legitimacy of the Admindevice. The Figure 21 shows the specification
of the environment role which consists of global constants, composition of the sessions,
and the knowledge of the intruder.
Figure 20. HLPSL specification for role edge.
The Hash2 is representing the hash function used in HMAC calculation with the secret
key K as shown in Figure 12. Since the intruder is not aware of the K, the Hash2 is
not included in intruder knowledge. The session role shows the basic roles Admindevice
and Edge are instanced with concrete arguments. Moreover, the Goal section in the
same figure shows that secrecy goal and authentication goal are verified. Here the
secrecy of sec_details represents that the Details’ is kept as a secret between Edge and
Admindevice. In the code it has been defined with the secret(Details’,sec_detail,{Edge,
Admindevice}). On the other hand, the Authentication_on edge_admindevice_Facial
states that facial input is verified at the Edge. This has been defined with the code
request(Edge, Admindevice, edge_admindevice_Facial, Facialrecognition).
Results of the admin registration part of the proposed scheme using OFMC backend
can be seen from the Figure 22. The results validates that the proposed scheme is safe.
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Figure 21. HLPSL specification for role session and environment.
Figure 22. Protocol verification results using OFMC backend.
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6.1.2 Registration of Company Doctors/Experts Devices
The implementation is based on the message flow shown in Figure 14. The implemented
HLPSL script and specifications of the role device is shown in Figure 23, and role Edge
is shown in Figure 24. The script for roles session and environment is shown in Figure
25. The HLPSL script works just like explained in the previous section but the notable
point in this scenario is that the network admin is already registered when he is about to
register the devices. Hence, Adminlogindetails have been declared as the known message
for both agents Device and Edge, before starting the initiation of communication.
Here two secrecy goals sec_C2, sec_details and two authentication goals
edge_device_auth_login and edge_device_auth_Facialrecognition have been defined.
sec_C2 represents the secrecy of puzzleans’ between Edge and Device, sec_details
represents the secrecy of doctor expert device details between the Edge and the
Device/network admin, edge_device_auth_login states Adminlogindetails of the admin
are verified at edge, edge_device_auth_Facialrecognition states that the Facialrecognition
input of the admin is verified at the edge.
Figure 23. HLPSL specification for role device.
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Figure 24. HLPSL specification for role edge.
Results of the registration of company doctors/experts devices part, of the proposed
scheme using OFMC backend can be seen from Figure 26. The results validate that the
proposed scheme is safe.
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Figure 25. HLPSL specification for role session and environment.
Figure 26. Protocol verification results using OFMC backend.
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6.1.3 Registration of Company Workers/Doctors/Experts
Explanation for the HLPSL implementation stays the same just like in the previous
case, but the message flow in this phase follows the Figure 15, the procedure for the
company workers follows the same flow as in the registration of the doctor and expert,
so inclusion of the separate code for the registration of the company workers has been
omitted. The implemented HLPSL script and specifications of the role Networkadmin is
shown in Figure 27, role edge is shown in Figure 28, role of session and environment is
shown in Figure 29.
Figure 27. HLPSL specification for role network admin.
Here two secrecy goals denoted as sec_1, sec_2 and two authentication goals denoted
as edge_networkadmin_auth_Adminlog, edge_networkadmin_auth_Facial have been
defined. sec_1 represents the secrecy of Adminlogindetails between Edge and
Networkadmin, likewise sec_2 represents the secrecy of Registrationdetails of the
doctor, expert and workers between the Edge and the Networkadmin, The
edge_networkadmin_auth_Adminlog states log-in details of the admin are verified at
Edgeserver, edge_networkadmin_auth_Facial states the facial recognition input of the
admin is verified at the Edgeserver.
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Figure 28. HLPSL specification for role edge server.
Results of the registration of company workers/doctors/experts part of the proposed
scheme using OFMC backend can be seen from Figure 30. The result validates that the
proposed scheme is safe.
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Figure 29. HLPSL specification for role session and environment.
Figure 30. Protocol verification results using OFMC backend.
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6.1.4 Registration of Edge Server
The implementation in this scenario is based on the message flow shown in Figure 11, the
implemented HLPSL script and specifications of the role Edgeserver is shown in Figure
31, role of CertificateAuthority which is the external certificate authority for the edge
server is shown in Figure 32, role of session and environment is shown in Figure 33.
Figure 31. HLPSL specification for role edgeserver.
In the message flow, the edge server sends a Hello’ message to the external certificate
authority and then the external certificate authority sends back puzzle for DoS attack
prevention together with {Kexca’}_inv(Kauth), which represents the X.509 certificate of
the external certificate authority. Here the Kauth is the public key corresponding to the
authority which gave the certificate to the external certificate authority. Upon receiving
this message, the edge server generates the public key and private key using RSA key
generation algorithm, but in HLPSL, it was not possible to implement that arithmetic,
hence as an alternative it is declared that the edge server already knows its public and
private key. Then the Edgeserver sends {Ns’.Nc’.Puzzleans’.Noncea’.Verification}_Kexca’
concatenated with the Kedge and {CSREdgeidentitydetails}_inv(Kedge). In a normal
scenario, once the CSR request is received, the external certificate authority verifies the
details of the edge server and authenticity of the details provided by other means, but it
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Figure 32. HLPSL specification for role certificate authority.
was not possible to simulate this scenario in the HLPSL language, hence a secret message
named Verification has been introduced between edge server and the external certificate
authority and verification is simulated by exchanging Verification message encrypted
with the public key of the external certificate authority.
The security goal for this scenario has been defined as the authentication_on auth_1,
which states the Verification message is verified at the external certificate authority.
The simulation result using OFMC backend, for this part of the proposed scheme using
can be seen from Figure 34. The result validates that the proposed scheme is safe.
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Figure 33. HLPSL specification for role session and environment.
Figure 34. Protocol verification results using OFMC backend.
45
6.2 Authentication Phase
The authentication phase has two main scenarios, first scenario is the authentication
phase between the Edge and Appuser. Since the registered users like network admin,
doctor, expert, and company workers, follow the similar authentication message flow,
all those entities have been commonly referred to as Appuser in the simulation. The
second scenario of the authentication phase is the authentication between Doctor and
Expert. These entities will mutually authenticate each other in the process of establishing
a secure connection with secret session key this process for each scenario is explained in
the upcoming subsections.
6.2.1 Authentication of Registered User
The message flow in this scenario follows Figure 17, the implemented HLPSL script and
specifications of the role Appuser is shown in Figure 35, role Edge is shown in Figure 36,
role of session and environment is shown in Figure 43.
Figure 35. HLPSL specification for role app user.
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Figure 36. HLPSL specification for role edge.
The message exchanges in this scenario happens in the usual way as explained in the
previous scenarios in registration phase. The AppUser sends his Logindetails encrypted
with the public key of the edge to make sure it is only accessible by edge server.
Moreover, the Appuser is already registered with the edge server, hence the logindetails
are declared to be known secret message between Appuser and Edge. Once the Edge
receives the message containing the logindetails, it verifies the logindetails with the stored
details. Then with the new Ruser’= exp(G,Xuser’) and already generated Xedge (in
Figure17, Xuser’ is denoted as ruser and Xedge as redge), it generates the session key from
Kaes’:=exp(Ruser’,Xedge), which is equivalent to Kaes’:= exp(exp(G,Xuser’),Xedge).
Then the Edge encrypts Kaes’ with the public key of the app user’s device, and signs
it with its private key. After that Edge sends the final message back to the app user
together with a finished message. The Appuser receives the session key safely and finally
sends back finished message.
Here the secrecy goal is defined as sec_1, and the authentication goals are
defined as edge_Appuser_auth_login and edge_AppUser_auth_Facialin. The sec_1
represents the secrecy of session key Kaes between Edge and the Appuser. The
edge_Appuser_auth_login states logindetails of the Appuser is verified at the Edge, and
edge_AppUser_auth_Facialin states the facial recognition input of the user is verified at
the Edge.
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Simulated result in OFMC backend for the proposed authentication scheme is shown
in Figure 38. The result validates that the proposed scheme is safe.
Figure 37. HLPSL specification for role session and environment.
Figure 38. Protocol verification results using OFMC backend.
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6.2.2 Authentication Between Doctor and Expert
The message flow in this scenario follows Figure 18, the implemented HLPSL script and
specifications of the role Doctor is shown in Figure 39, the role Expert is shown in Figure
40, role Edgeserver1 is shown in Figure 41, role Edgeserver2 is shown in Figure 42, role
session and environment is shown in Figure 43.
In Figure 43 two secrecy goals sec_1,sec_2, and two authentication goals
edge1_doctor_kaes and edge2_expert_kaes have been defined. sec_1 represents the
secrecy of Kaes between Edge1 and Doctor, sec_2 represents the secrecy of Kaes between
the Edge2 and the Expert. On the other hand, edge1_doctor_kaes states Kaes is verified
at Doctor that it has been generated by Edge1, and edge2_expert_kaes states Kaes is
verified at Expert that it has been generated by Edge2.
Verification result using OFMC backend for the proposed authentication scheme
between Doctor and Expert can be seen from the Figure 44. The result validates that
the proposed scheme is safe.
Figure 39. HLPSL specification for role doctor.
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Figure 40. HLPSL specification for role expert.
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Figure 41. HLPSL specification for role edge server1.
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Figure 42. HLPSL specification for role edge server2.
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Figure 43. HLPSL specification for role session and environment
Result of the Authentication between doctor and expert part of the proposed scheme
using OFMC backend can be seen from the Figure 44. The results validates that the
proposed scheme is safe.
Figure 44. Protocol verification results using OFMC backend.
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7 INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
This chapter discusses the informal verification of the prevention of possible attacks in
our proposed scheme. In the formal verification, we have already proved that the scheme
provides protection against man in the middle attack and replay attack. Apart from
those attacks following threats are also mitigated by our scheme.
Protection against impersonation attack:
In the registration phase when the entity initiates the communication with the edge
server, it expects the edge server to send back an initial message with its X.509 certificate
issued by a legitimate external certificate authority. This certificate cannot be generated
by the intruder, hence it prevents the adversary from impersonating the edge server.
Moreover, in the registration phase of the network admin, network admin is required
to provide his facial recognition input, after feeding the registration details. Then the
edge server verifies it with the already stored details of the network admin and this
prevents an adversary from impersonating the network admin. In all the other cases of
the registration phase, network admin is required to provide his user name and password
as a way to authenticate himself to the edge server and at the end of registration, he
is also required to give his facial recognition input as an additional authentication to
prove his identity. This two factor authentication provides strong protection against the
impersonation attack.
Likewise, in the authentication phase, when the registered users like network admin,
workers, doctor, patient, and expert initiates the communication with the edge server,
they are required to provide their user name and password, and their facial recognition
input. This two factor authentication prevents the intruder from impersonating a
registered user.
In the authentication phase between doctor and expert, edge servers verifies the client
requests with their implicit certificates, and they also authenticate the session keys by
signing it with their private keys. It prevents from any impersonation attack in this phase.
Hence, we conclude that our scheme has strong protection against the impersonation
attack.
Protection against DoS attack:
In our scheme, we have implemented a challenge-based mechanism [45] to prevent the
DoS attack. In both phases, the edge server provides a challenge to the entity initiating
the communication. The difficulty of the challenge which depends on Kdos is adjusted
with the severity of the DoS attack present. Normally the challenge will be in moderate
difficulty but when there is a lot of requests in the ques for the edge server, it increases
the difficulty. Also answer for the puzzle depends on the random number generated in
the client’s side, so this answer cannot be used in another instance. Incorporating this
puzzle-based prevention mechanism guards our scheme against DoS attack.
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Protection against password guessing attack:
In the message exchanges which consists of the user name and password, the secrecy
of the password is preserved by encrypting it with the public key of the edge server,
which only allows the edge server to have the access of it. Then as an extra layer of
protection, only the hash of the password is exchanged instead of the direct passwords.
Hence, even if the attacker gets the access for the hashed password, he will not be able
to decode it. Also in the scheme it is required to provide facial recognition input as a
final authentication, it prevents the attacker to fully authenticate himself, therefore he
will never be able to pass these three layer protection and log into the account.
Protection against privileged insider attack:
When a privileged insider from the company or hospital gets the access of the password
and use it to log into the user account, the scheme requires the attacker to use a device
with registered MAC address which acts as a layer of protection against insiders. Even
if the adversary acquired the access for a registered device, as a final authentication
requirement of the scheme, he will have to provide facial recognition input. This three-
factor authentication in our scheme prevents the privileged insider attack from happening.
In the case of patient’s registration, he does not have a device to be registered.
Therefore the network admin feeds all the details from his device, then the password
for the patient will be sent to the patient’s phone number. Each time the patient tries to
log in with his user name and password, a verification code will be sent to his registered
mobile number, and he will also be asked for facial recognition input similar to other
scenarios. This three-factor authentication ensures that, even the highly privileged insider
will not be able to have access to the patient’s account and data.
Protection against device capture attack:
Assume the adversary gets the access to the MAR device, The required log-in
credentials prevents the adversary from accessing the account. Even if he manages to get
the user name and passwords he will be required to provide the facial recognition input,
which makes it impossible for the adversary to perform the attack even after taking back
the control of the MAR device.
Protection against message tampering:
In our scheme we have used HMAC function with two keys, one key is the public key
of the edge server, and the other key is a secret key K between Edge server and the
communicating entity. The secret key is computed for message instance and exchanged
using Elliptic-Curve-Diffie-Hellman(ECDH) key exchange algorithm. ECDH makes it
impossible for the intruder to access the secret key K. Normally HMAC is enough to check
the integrity of the message but the strength of the algorithm depends on the complexity
of the key being used for the hash functions involved. So by generating a secret key
K which can never be accessible by the adversary, and using it in the computation of
HMAC, we ensured the message integrity throughout the process and made our system
highly protected against message tampering.
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8 DISCUSSION
In this section, a critical analysis is presented considering the objectives of the thesis and
how well they are being met. Finally, future research directions have been discussed.
8.1 Evaluation on Meeting the Thesis Objectives
The objective of the thesis is to propose a secure and privacy-preserving AR application
to be used in the health care sector. Given the potential of AR technology, there are
numerous options in incorporating technology in the health care sector. However, this
thesis is directed towards addressing a current issue in the health care sector in rural
areas, without compromising the security and privacy of the users.
In the thesis initially an architecture for a MAR application has been defined with
key features such as displaying augmented view of patient information on the mobile
device, augmenting the X-ray or scan image on top of the patient’s actual body parts
to assist the doctor, and enabling the doctor to interact with an expert and get real-
time consultancy. Then all the possible security threats for the defined architecture
have been analyzed, and possible solutions have been proposed. In order to establish
a secure end to end communication link between the participating entities, it is vital
to have strong authentication and key management scheme for the application. Hence,
a strong authentication and key exchange scheme has been proposed for each scenario
of the application. After that, the proposed scheme has been verified by using widely
accepted formal and informal protocol verification methods.
8.2 Future Research Directions
The thesis defines the architecture of the AR application with basic functions, which
includes a doctor, a patient, and an expert. This application considers one doctor
requesting assistance from one expert, and it was assumed that the expert is always
available, which is not practical, in reality, there will be multiple doctors and multiple
experts, and there could be overwhelming requests for the experts, which might question
the availability of the experts. We can address this issue with two options; first, we could
incorporate machine learning-based model which could learn from the previous collective
consultations from the all the experts using the application, and then provide automated
consultations and assistance in less serious issues. Secondly, we could introduce a pool
of experts and depending on the availability of the experts, the doctors should be able
to initiate the communication resource management queuing, and security has to be
properly addressed for this case.
Further, we have assumed that the expert and doctor are being registered in an edge
server and they are always reporting to their respective edge servers only. But in reality,
the expert might be traveling to many places, and in this case, his credentials, certificate
and other authentication details should be safely migrated from one edge server to
another, and a proper key management scheme should be proposed for this complex
case as well.
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Even though the proposed scheme is secure enough to make the proposed application
to reality, there is always room for additional protection by incorporating all the proposed
solutions in the security analysis chapter and also incorporating the other security
techniques like blockchain and embedded systems level security.
The thesis is focused on the conceptual design of the AR application, and the security
validation is done using formal and informal verification of the proposed protocol. But
the security of the application could be further justified by implementing the full real
AR application in MAR device and simulating all the communication scenarios in
a real experimental environment and validating the security level of the application
by performing all the possible attacks. This practical software implementation also
introduces another research direction to optimize protocol, process flow, and device
selection for the application in order to achieve the desired latency levels.
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9 CONCLUSION
The goal of the research work is to propose a secure key exchange scheme for MAR
application in the health care sector. In this thesis, we proposed an architecture for a
MAR health care application based on MEC. Then we analyzed the security threats
specific to the proposed architecture and proposed viable solutions to address those
issues. After that, we proposed a registration and authentication key management
scheme for each scenario of the application. Then we used widely accepted formal and
informal verification methods to validate the security properties of our proposed scheme.
The results of both methods yielded that the proposed scheme is secure enough to be
implemented. As an outcome of the thesis, we have proposed a viable architecture for a
revolutionary MAR health care application and produced a highly secure, registration,
and authentication key management scheme for the application. With application specific
modifications, our proposed key management scheme has the potential to be used in any
similar, privacy concerned sensitive MAR health care applications.
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